Birney, Mayling (2014) Decentralization and veiled corruption under China's "rule of mandates". World Development, 53. pp. 55-67. ISSN 0305-750X
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Abstract
This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate-serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non-implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/world-development... |
Additional Information: | © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. |
Divisions: | International Development Government |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology H Social Sciences > HX Socialism. Communism. Anarchism J Political Science > JQ Political institutions Asia, Africa, Australia, Pacific J Political Science > JS Local government Municipal government K Law > K Law (General) |
Date Deposited: | 08 May 2013 08:53 |
Last Modified: | 30 Oct 2024 19:09 |
Funders: | The Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/45826 |
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