Duddy, Conal, Perote-Peña, Juan and Piggins, Ashley (2012) Non-manipulable partitioning. New mathematics and natural computation, 08 (02). pp. 273-282. ISSN 1793-0057
Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements of X as belonging in one of two sets. The individuals may disagree as to how the elements of X should be classified, and so an aggregation rule is applied to determine a compromise outcome. We require that the social classification should not be imposed, nor should it be manipulable. We prove that the only aggregation rules satisfying these properties are dictatorships.
|Additional Information:||© 2012 World Scientific|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||aggregation, non-manipulation, partitions|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method|
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