Kühn, Kai-Uwe and Van Reenen, John (2008) Capacity constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl. Centre for Economic Performance special papers, CEPSP19. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Download (128Kb) | Preview
Scrutiny of potential mergers by the European Commission often focuses on unilateral effects or single firm dominance. But some cases have involved concerns over coordinated effects: the concern that the merger could increase the likelihood of consumer harm through tacit collusion by the reduced number of firms in the industry (this is known as collective dominance). The economic and legal issues are far less certain in these cases and a particular challenge is how to bring empirical evidence to bear on the decision. In this chapter we examine a case in newsprint and magazine paper - UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl . Here, coordinated effects were at the centre of the Commission’s concerns. We discuss how collusion theory and evidence were used to help clear the merger without remedies in the final Decision.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Other)|
|Additional Information:||© 2008 K-U. Kühn and J. Van Reenen ISBN 9780853282532|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||L - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L73 - Forest Products: Lumber and Paper
L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Departments > Economics
|Date Deposited:||21 Apr 2008 14:55|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|