Climate models, calibration, and confirmation

Werndl, Charlotte and Steele, Katie (2013) Climate models, calibration, and confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64 (3). pp. 609-635. ISSN 0007-0882

Preview

PDF - Accepted Version Download (638kB) | Preview

• Author

Abstract

We argue that concerns about double-counting -- using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate --deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelihood approach to incremental confirmation. According to this approach, double-counting is entirely proper. We go on to discuss plausible difficulties with calibrating climate models, and we distinguish more and less ambitious notions of confirmation. Strong claims of confirmation may not, in many cases, be warranted, but it would be a mistake to regard double-counting as the culprit

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
Additional Information:	© 2013 The Authors. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited:	07 Jun 2012 10:15
Last Modified:	13 Nov 2024 20:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/44236

Actions (login required)

View Item