Koriyama, Yukio and Szentes, Balázs (2009) A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theoretical economics, 4 (2). pp. 227-252. ISSN 1555-7561
Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://econtheory.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Econometric Society |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | voting, information aggregation, costly information |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty |
| Sets: | Departments > Economics Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/42025/ |
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