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A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Koriyama, Yukio and Szentes, Balázs (2009) A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theoretical Economics, 4 (2). pp. 227-252. ISSN 1555-7561

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://econtheory.org/
Additional Information: © 2009 Econometric Society
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Economics
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 24 Feb 2012 10:27
Last Modified: 17 Oct 2012 13:47
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/42025

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