Koriyama, Yukio and Szentes, Balázs (2009) A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Theoretical Economics, 4 (2). pp. 227-252. ISSN 1933-6837
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://econtheory.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Econometric Society |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty |
| Date Deposited: | 24 Feb 2012 10:27 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 22:44 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/42025 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
