Campbell, Arthur, Ederer, Florian and Spinnewijn, Johannes (2011) Time to decide: information search and revelation in groups. In: STICERD Economic Theory Seminars, 30 June 2011, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. (Unpublished)
We analyze costly information acquisition and information revelation in groups evaluating dif- ferent decision options in a dynamic setting. Even when group members have perfectly aligned interests the group may ine¢ ciently delay decisions. When deadlines are absent or far, unin- formed group members freeride on each others efforts to acquire information. When deadlines come close, successful group members stop revealing their information in an attempt to incen- tivize others to continue searching for information. Surprisingly, setting a tighter deadline may increase the expected decision time and increase the expected accuracy of the decision in the unique equilibrium. As long as the deadline is set optimally, welfare is higher when information is only privately observable to the agent who obtained information rather than to the entire group.
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