Felsenthal, Dan S. and Machover, Moshé (2001) The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 18 (3). pp. 431-464. ISSN 0176-1714
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Identification Number: 10.1007/s003550100137
Abstract
We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the 'definitive form' of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/0035... |
Additional Information: | Published 2001 © Springer. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. |
Divisions: | LSE |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
Date Deposited: | 19 Oct 2005 |
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 21:27 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/420 |
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