Peters, Michael and Szentes, Balázs (2012) Definable and contractible contracts. Econometrica, 80 (1). pp. 363-411. ISSN 0012-9682
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their actions on the contracts of other players. These contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. This is accomplished by constructing contracts which are definable functions of the Godel code of every other player's contract. We provide a complete characterization of the set of allocations supportable as pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria of this contracting game. When information is complete, this characterization provides a folk theorem. In general, the set of supportable allocations is smaller than the set supportable by a centralized mechanism designer.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 The Econometric Society. |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General > C11 - Bayesian Analysis |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Feb 2012 15:49 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Nov 2024 17:03 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/41983 |
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