Sales and collusion in a market with storage

Nava, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0008-9593-3650 (2006) Sales and collusion in a market with storage. Discussion Paper (TE/2011/549). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (446kB) | Preview

• Publisher
• Related Item

Abstract

Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon that has been documented in several product markets. Regularities in such periodic price reductions appear to suggest that the phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to random variations in supply, demand, or the aggregate price level. Certain sales are traditional and so well publicized that it is difficult to justify them as devices to separate informed from uninformed consumers. This paper presents a model in which sellers want to reduce prices periodically in order to improve their ability to collude over time. In particular, the study shows that if buyers have heterogeneous storage technologies, periodic sales may facilitate collusion by magnifying intertemporal linking in consumers' decisions. The stability and the profitability of different sale strategies is then explored. The optimal sales discount and timing of sales are characterized. A trade-off between cartel size and aggregate profits arises.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2006 The Author
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Date Deposited:	20 Feb 2012 16:33
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 04:52
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/41959

Actions (login required)

View Item