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Expectations and choiceworthiness

Alexander, J. McKenzie (2011) Expectations and choiceworthiness. Mind, 120 (479). pp. 803-817. ISSN 0026-4423

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Identification Number: 10.1093/mind/fzr049


The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of the Pasadena game, I argue that weak expectations may provide a very poor measure of the value of an individual play of the game, and hence should not be used to value individual plays unless further information is taken into consideration.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2011 The author
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Date Deposited: 19 Jan 2012 11:47
Last Modified: 20 Jul 2021 00:53

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