Understanding rules and institutions: possibilities and limits of game theory

Woodruff, David M. ORCID: 0000-0001-7503-8052 (2006) Understanding rules and institutions: possibilities and limits of game theory. Qualitative Methods Newsletter, 4 (1). pp. 13-17. ISSN 1544-8045

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Abstract

Examines whether the modelling of institutions as equilibrium strategies in a repeated game is effective, arguing that it can be, but only in those circumstances in which local context is unimportant. Discusses the analytic dangers that arise when susceptibility of institutions to compact game-theoretic modelling is assumed when incentives are in fact contextual.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/QualitativeMe...
Additional Information:	© 2006 American Political Science Association
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Date Deposited:	06 Apr 2008 12:45
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 05:17
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4111

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