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Attribute coordination in organizations

Qian, Yingyi and Roland, Gerard and Xu, Cheng-Gang (2001) Attribute coordination in organizations. Annals of Economics and Finance, 2 (2). pp. 487-518. ISSN 1529-7373

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Abstract

We study coordination in organizations with a variety of organizational forms. Coordination in organization is modeled as the adjustment of attributes and capacities of tasks when facing external shocks. An M-form (U-form) organization groups complementary (substitutable) tasks together in one unit. In the presence of only attribute shocks, particularly when gains from specialization are small, communication is poor, or shocks are more likely, the expected payoff of the decentralized M-form is the highest. When facing both types of shocks, centralization does better if communication is good. The implications of organizational forms for the patterns of innovations and reforms within an organization, particularly centralized versus decentralized experiments and top-down versus bottom-up reforms, are discussed.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.aeconf.net/
Additional Information: © 2001 Peking University Press
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Date Deposited: 27 Mar 2008 15:53
Last Modified: 01 May 2012 15:15
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3938

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