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Topological theories of social choice

Baigent, Nicholas (2010) Topological theories of social choice. In: Arrow, Kenneth and Sen, A. K. and Suzumura, Kotaro, (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Handbooks in Economics,2. Elsevier, London, UK, pp. 301-334. ISBN 9780444508942

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Identification Number: 10.1016/S0169-7218(10)00018-3

Abstract

This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto implies the existence of a Strategic Manipulator. Given the role of continuity in all these results, its justification is critically discussed. Finally, a remarkable proof of Arrow's theorem using topological methods is presented. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Book Section
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/
Additional Information: © 2010 Elsevier
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2011 14:04
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2011 13:47
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/38787

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