Baigent, Nicholas (2010) Topological theories of social choice. In: Arrow, Kenneth, Sen, A. K. and Suzumura, Kotaro, (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Handbooks in Economics ,2 . Elsevier, London, UK, pp. 301-334. ISBN 9780444508942
Abstract
This chapter presents a simple introduction to the main results in topological social choice theory. Given a continuous social welfare function, these results show the following: (i) Unanimity and Anonymity are incompatible; (ii) Weak Pareto and No Veto are incompatible; and (iii) Weak Pareto implies the existence of a Strategic Manipulator. Given the role of continuity in all these results, its justification is critically discussed. Finally, a remarkable proof of Arrow's theorem using topological methods is presented. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | ISI |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic H Social Sciences > HM Sociology |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
| Sets: | Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/38787/ |
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