Azpitarte, Francisco (2011) Can corruption constrain the size of governments? European Journal of Law and Economics, 32 (1). pp. 1-14. ISSN 0929-1261
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between government size and the level of corruption. We propose a theoretical model where production decisions and corrupt behavior are endogenously determined. We model corruption assuming production in the formal sector is regulated by public officials who can use their public power for private gain. In this context, the underground economy emerges as an outside option that allows entrepreneurs to avoid dealing with bureaucrats. The fact that investments in the informal sector may influence public finances, introduces the possibility of multiple equilibria with different levels of corruption. Consistent with previous theoretical works and recent empirical evidence, we find out that corruption and the shadow economy are complements as they positively correlate across equilibria, which implies that corruption may limit the size of the public sector
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.springerlink.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 Springer |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Aug 2011 10:44 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:56 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37935 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
