Massó, Jordi and Moreno de Barreda, Inés (2011) On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness. Games and Economic Behavior, 72 (2). pp. 467-484. ISSN 0899-8256
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 Elsevier |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Aug 2011 15:54 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Feb 2024 20:45 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37736 |
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