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Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Bozbay, Irem and Dietrich, Franz and Peters, Hans (2011) Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 407-417. ISSN 0899-8256

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.007

Abstract

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio...
Additional Information: © 2011 Elsevier
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 28 Jul 2011 15:25
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2012 17:53
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37658

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