Bozbay, Irem, Dietrich, Franz and Peters, Hans (2011) Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 407-417. ISSN 0899-8256
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2011 Elsevier |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2011 15:25 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2025 19:39 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37658 |
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