Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs

Grüll, Georg and Taschini, Luca ORCID: 0000-0001-5355-1736 (2010) Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (26). Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper examines the key design mechanisms of existing and proposed cap-and-trade markets. First, it is shown that the hybrid systems under investigation (price floor using a minimum price guarantee, price collar, allowance reserve, options offered by the regulator, and offset relaxation) can be decomposed into a combination of an ordinary cap-and-trade scheme with European- or American-style call and put options. Then, we quantify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed hybrid schemes by investigating whether pre-set objectives (enforcement of permit price bounds and reduction of the compliance costs for relevant companies) can be accomplished while maintaining the original environmental targets. Plain vanilla options are proposed as an alternative that reconciles the otherwise conflicting policy objectives.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://www2.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/Home.aspx
Additional Information:	© 2010 The Author
Divisions:	Grantham Research Institute
Subjects:	G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C60 - General H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q52 - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy
Date Deposited:	26 Jul 2011 13:59
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 19:02
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37597

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