Pollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoption

Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago and Taschini, Luca ORCID: 0000-0001-5355-1736 (2011) Pollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoption. Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment working papers (45). Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are interdependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value rejects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://www2.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/Home.aspx
Additional Information:	© 2011 The Authors
Divisions:	Grantham Research Institute
Subjects:	G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics
Date Deposited:	25 Jul 2011 14:06
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 20:18
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/37581

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