Enforcing intellectual property rights

Olson Lanjouw, Jean and Schankerman, Mark ORCID: 0009-0006-1071-7672 (2001) Enforcing intellectual property rights. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period 1978- 1999 by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage “cooperative” interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation to mitigate this adverse effect of high enforcement costs

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2001 by Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General)
JEL classification:	K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process
Date Deposited:	05 Mar 2008 14:39
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3730

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