Musholt, Kristina (2012) Concepts or metacognition – what is the issue: commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “the concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness”. Consciousness and cognition, 21 (2). pp. 721-722. ISSN 1053-8100
The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so much conceptual but rather metacognitive abilities.
|Additional Information:||© 2012 Elsevier|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||animal cognition, concepts, metacognition, nonconceptual content, self-consciousness|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method|
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