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Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns

Levy, Gilat (2000) Strategic consultation in the presence of career concerns. TE/00/404. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Identification Number: TE/00/404

Abstract

In this paper I analyse the strategic interaction of decision makers and their advisers in a consultation process. I find that when agents are concerned about their reputation, consultation results in sub-optimal sharing of information; some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult even when advice is costless. When they do consult, decision makers may excessively contradict their adviser’s recommendation. Anticipating it, advisers may not report their information truthfully. These results are obtained without assuming either a tournament or a competition between decision makers and their advisers for wages or a future job.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information: © 2000 Gilat Levy
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Departments > Economics
Date Deposited: 29 Feb 2008
Last Modified: 01 Oct 2010 08:50
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3627

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