Levy, Gilat (2003) Careerist judges. TE/03/457. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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In this paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to contradict previous decisions inefficiently. I also show that judges behave more efficiently when elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2003 Gilat Levy|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||J Political Science > JC Political theory
K Law > K Law (General)
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Departments > Economics
|Date Deposited:||29 Feb 2008|
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