Poblete Lavanchy, Joaquin J. and Spulber, Daniel F. (2012) The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality and limited liability. RAND Journal of Economics, 43 (2). pp. 215-234. ISSN 0741-6261
The analysis obtains a complete characterization of the optimal agency contract with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a “critical ratio” that indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives for effort in each random state. The form of the contract is debt (a capped bonus) when the critical ratio is increasing (decreasing) in the state. An increasing critical ratio in the state-space setting corresponds to the hazard rate order for the reduced-form distribution of output, which we term the “decreasing hazard rate in effort property” (DHREP). The critical ratio also yields insights into agency with adverse selection.
|Additional Information:||© 2011 RAND|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group|
|Date Deposited:||12 May 2011 10:55|
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