Endogenous lobbying

Felli, Leonardo and Merlo, Antonio (2003) Endogenous lobbying. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2003 by the authors
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group STICERD Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HF Commerce > HF5601 Accounting
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2008
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:35
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3590

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