de Meza, David and Lockwood, Ben (1998) Does asset ownership always motivate managers? The property rights theory of the firm and outside options. Quarterly journal of economics, 113 (2). pp. 361-386. ISSN 0033-5533
Abstract
This paper studies the Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) “property rights” approach to the theory of the firm under alternating-offers bargaining. When managers can pursue other occupations while negotiating over the division of the gains from cooperation, the GHM results obtain. If taking the best alternative job terminates bargaining, outcomes are very different. Sometimes an agent with an important investment decision should not own the assets he works with; sometimes independent assets should be owned together; sometimes strictly complementary assets should be owned separately.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1998 The President and Fellows of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Sets: | Research centres and groups > Managerial Economics and Strategy Group Departments > Management Collections > Economists Online |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35864/ |
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