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Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory

Carraro, Carlo and Marchiori, Carmen and Sgobbi, Alessandra (2007) Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory. Environment and Development Economics, 12 (02). p. 329. ISSN 1355-770X

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Identification Number: 10.1017/S1355770X06003536

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water management problems. The interest in this subject stems from two considerations: (i) water resources continue to be mismanaged, despite their recognized importance for sustainable development, in particular in developing countries; (ii) negotiated decision making has the potential to improve water management, yet there is still little formal understanding of the forces driving bargaining processes, and applications of formal negotiation theory to water issues are also lacking. This paper surveys the existing non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water management problems, with the purpose of preliminarily assessing whether such a formal approach in the phase of problem exploration and policy formulation can support decision makers in the real world. It is the contention of this paper that the proposed approach may offer direct and indirect support by: shortening the time needed to reach an agreement through the (theoretical) identification of an ‘acceptability space’, and helping select policies which are self-enforcing and, therefore, acceptable.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information: © 2007 Cambridge University Press
Subjects: G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences
Sets: Departments > Geography and Environment
Date Deposited: 03 May 2011 13:22
Last Modified: 12 Jul 2012 08:31
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/35842

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