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General representation of epistemically optimal procedures

Dietrich, Franz (2006) General representation of epistemically optimal procedures. Social Choice and Welfare, 26 (2). pp. 263-283. ISSN 1432-217X

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s00355-006-0094-2

Abstract

Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log likelihood ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (“Epistemic Monotonicity”) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be a vote for an alternative; it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a profile of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known here.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/0176-1714/
Additional Information: © 2006 Springer
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Sets: Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 03 May 2011 11:34
Last Modified: 03 May 2011 11:34
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/35826

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