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Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence

Bayer, Ralph and Cowell, Frank (2009) Tax compliance and firms' strategic interdependence. Journal of Public Economics, 93 (11-12). pp. 1131-1143. ISSN 0047-2727

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.007


We focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax-compliance literature in economics, the behaviour of firms. We examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic interdependence of firms. The enforcement policy can have an effect on firms' behaviour in two dimensions — their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour. An appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a “double dividend” by manipulating firms in both dimensions.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2009 Elsevier B.V.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification: H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Sets: Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE)
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 03 May 2011 10:41
Last Modified: 30 May 2014 13:55

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