Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher (2006) Firm-specific training. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity enhancement and employee evaluation. In the informal model, training results in a proportionate increase in productivity enhancement and employee evaluation, and training is underprovided by the market. In the productivityenhancement model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In both models, turnover is inefficiently low.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts... |
| Additional Information: | © 2006 Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris. |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group STICERD Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2008 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:46 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3571 |
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