On the theory of ethnic conflict

Caselli, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0001-5191-7156 and Coleman II, Wilbur John (2006) On the theory of ethnic conflict. . London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

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Abstract

We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy’s resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2006 The Authors
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	P - Economic Systems > P4 - Other Economic Systems > P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2008
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 03:17
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3561

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