Piccione, Michele and Razin, Ronny 
ORCID: 0009-0009-5169-0180
(2009)
Coalition formation under power relations.
Theoretical Economics, 4 (1).
pp. 1-15.
ISSN 1933-6837
Abstract
We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order, which incorporates a notion of robustness to variable power relations. We provide a complete characterization of strongly stable social orders.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://econtheory.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D0 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making |
| Date Deposited: | 08 Apr 2011 11:35 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:35 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/35434 |
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