Rules for followers: institutional theory and the new politics of economic backwardness in Russia

Woodruff, David M. ORCID: 0000-0001-7503-8052 (2000) Rules for followers: institutional theory and the new politics of economic backwardness in Russia. Politics & Society, 28 (4). pp. 437-482. ISSN 0032-3292

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Abstract

I investigate contemporary Russia's real, but shallow success in implementing two borrowed capitalist institutions—a monetary system and the joint-stock company. Even though money and shares of stock in Russia are exchanged in voluntary transactions, they fail to play the legal roles ordinarily expected of them, resulting in weak corporate governance and nonmonetary (barter) exchange. Via a criticism of game-theoretic approaches to institutions in the New Institutional Economics, I argue that the roots of this shallow marketization lie in the distinct social foundations of the transactional and legal roles of money and corporate stock. Arguments drawn from sociological institutionalism then illuminate why Russia displays this limited isomorphism to authoritative international models of market institutions. The article concludes by discussing implications for a third body of institutional theory, historical institutionalism, and the possible broader relevance of the pattern of shallow marketization in contemporary relatively backward countries.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://pas.sagepub.com/
Additional Information:	© 2000 Sage Publications
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Date Deposited:	19 Feb 2008
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 05:14
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3476

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