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Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk

Chassang, Sylvain and Padró i Miquel, Gerard (2010) Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (4). pp. 1821-1858. ISSN 0033-5533

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Identification Number: 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821


We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
U Military Science > U Military Science (General)
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Date Deposited: 05 Apr 2011 08:49
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2024 21:54

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