Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence

Besley, Timothy ORCID: 0000-0002-8923-6372 and Preston, Ian (2007) Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (4). pp. 1473-1510. ISSN 0033-5533

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
Additional Information:	© 2007 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) > JN101 Great Britain
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Date Deposited:	30 Mar 2011 11:43
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2024 05:17
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/33745

Actions (login required)

View Item