Ghatak, Maitreesh ORCID: 0000-0002-0126-0897 and Mueller, Hannes
(2011)
Thanks for nothing?: not-for-profits and motivated agents.
Journal of Public Economics, 95 (1-2).
pp. 94-105.
ISSN 0047-2727
Abstract
We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier B.V. |
Divisions: | STICERD |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2011 15:47 |
Last Modified: | 01 Feb 2025 05:54 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/33373 |
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