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Democratic differences: electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements

Rickard, Stephanie (2010) Democratic differences: electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements. European Journal of International Relations, 16 (4). pp. 711-729. ISSN 1460-3713

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Abstract

A growing body of literature argues that democracies are more likely to comply with international agreements than authoritarian states. However, substantial variation exists in the compliance behaviour of democracies. How can this variation be explained? The same mechanism that links regime type to compliance, namely electoral competition, also explains variation in compliance among democracies. This is because the nature of electoral competition varies across democratic systems. An analysis of democratic GATT/WTO member countries from 1980 to 2003 reveals that governments elected via majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-member districts are more likely to violate GATT/WTO agreements than those elected via proportional electoral rules and/or multi-member districts.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://ejt.sagepub.com/
Additional Information: © 2010 European Consortium for Political Research, SAGE Publications
Library of Congress subject classification: J Political Science > JX International law
J Political Science > JZ International relations
Sets: Departments > Government
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Date Deposited: 07 Mar 2011 16:27
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/33008/

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