Webb, David C. (2009) Asymmetric information, long-term care insurance, and annuities: the case for bundled contracts. Journal of risk and insurance, 76 (1). pp. 53-85. ISSN 0022-4367
This article examines the markets for long-term care insurance and annuities when there is asymmetric information and there are costs of administering contracts. Individuals differ in terms of their risk aversion. Risk-averse individuals take more care of their health and are relatively high risk in the annuities market and relatively low risk in the long-term care insurance market. In the long-term care insurance market, both separating and partial-pooling equilibria are possible. However, in the stand-alone annuity market, only separating equilibria are possible. We show, consistent with the extant empirical research, that in the presence of administration costs the more risk-averse individuals may buy relatively more long-term care insurance and more annuity coverage. Under the same assumptions, we show that equilibria exist with bundled contracts that Pareto dominate the outcomes with stand-alone contracts and are robust to competition from stand-alone contracts. The remaining empirical puzzle is to explain why bundled contracts are such a small share of the voluntary annuity market.
|Additional Information:||© 2009 The Journal of Risk and Insurance|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD61 Risk Management
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
|Sets:||Departments > Finance|
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