Schulz, Armin (2011) Gigerenzer’s evolutionary arguments against rational choice theory: an assessment. Philosophy of science, 78 (5). pp. 1272-1282. ISSN 0031-8248
I critically discuss a recent innovation in the debate surrounding the plausibility of rational choice theory (RCT): the appeal to evolutionary theory. Specifically, I assess Gigerenzer and colleagues’ claim that considerations based on natural selection show that, instead of making decisions in a RCT-like way, we rely on ‘simple heuristics’. As I try to make clearer here, though, Gigerenzer and colleagues’ arguments are unconvincing: we lack the needed information about our past to determine whether the premises on which they are built are true—and, hence, we cannot tell whether they, in fact, speak against RCT.
|Additional Information:||© 2011 Philosophy of Science Association|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Sets:||Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method|
Actions (login required)
|Record administration - authorised staff only|