List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X and Menzies, Peter
(2009)
Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle.
The Journal of Philosophy, CVI (9).
pp. 475-502.
ISSN 0022-362X
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Abstract
It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/ |
Additional Information: | © 2009 Journal of Philosophy. This article is made available for personal use only, with special permission from the Journal of Philosophy. Publishers and others wishing to use this article for commercial or educational purposes should contact permissions@journalofphilosophy.org |
Divisions: | Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 24 Jan 2011 14:09 |
Last Modified: | 13 Aug 2024 07:57 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/31617 |
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