Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Peyrache, Eloic and Quesada, Lucia (2009) The ownership of ratings. RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (2). pp. 234-257. ISSN 0741-6261
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Wiley-Blackwell |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Apr 2011 17:25 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:33 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/30498 |
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