Bas, Maria and Carluccio, Juan (2009) Wage bargaining and the boundaries of the multinational firm. CEP Discussion Paper, No. 963. Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Do variations in labor market institutions across countries affect the cross-border organization of the firm? Using firm-level data on multinationals located in France, we show that firms are more likely to outsource the production of intermediate inputs to external suppliers when importing from countries with empowered unions. Moreover, this effect is stronger for firms operating in capital-intensive industries. We propose a theoretical mechanism that rationalizes these findings. The fragmentation of the value chain weakens the union's bargaining position, by limiting the amount of revenues that are subject to union extraction. The outsourcing strategy reduces the share of surplus that is appropriated by the union, which enhances the firm's incentives to invest. Since investment creates relatively more value in capital-intensive industries, increases in union power are more likely to be conducive to outsourcing in those industries. Overall, our findings suggest that multinational firms use their organizational structure strategically when sourcing intermediate inputs from unionized markets.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2009 The authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F10 - General
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries
|Sets:||Collections > Economists Online
Research centres and groups > Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
|Identification Number:||No. 963|
|Date Deposited:||16 Jul 2010 15:32|
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