Dietrich, Franz (2010) The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications. Journal of economic theory, 145 (2). pp. 603-638. ISSN 1095-7235
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Abstract
The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier B.V. |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | ISI,Judgment aggregation; Subjunctive implication; Material implication; Characterisation of possibility agendas |
| Library of Congress subject classification: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D79 - Other |
| Sets: | Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Rights: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/rights/LSERO.htm |
| Identification Number: | ISI:000276926200008 |
| URL: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/27899/ |
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