Review of paradoxes afflicting various voting procedures where one out of m candidates (m ≥ 2) must be elected

Felsenthal, Dan S. (2010) Review of paradoxes afflicting various voting procedures where one out of m candidates (m ≥ 2) must be elected. In: Assessing Alternative Voting Procedures, 2010-04-01, London, United Kingdom, GBR.

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Abstract

The paper surveys 17 deterministic electoral procedures for selecting one out of two or more candidates, as well as the susceptibility of each of these procedures to various paradoxes. A detailed appendix exemplifies the paradoxes to which each electoral procedure is susceptible. It is concluded that from the perspective of vulnerability to serious paradoxes, as well as in light of additional technical criteria, Copeland’s or Kemeny’s proposed procedures are the most desirable.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Official URL:	http://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNSS/Home.aspx
Additional Information:	© 2010 Dan S. Felsenthal
Divisions:	CPNSS
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	09 Apr 2010 13:33
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 14:06
Funders:	The Leverhulme Trust, London School of Economics and Political Science, Chateau du Baffy, Normandy, France
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/27685

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