Dietrich, Franz (2009) Bayesian group belief. LSE Choice Group working paper series, vol. 5, no. 5. The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics, London, UK.
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If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of group members, who are themselves modelled as Bayesian agents and, crucially, may have different information. They may also have different prior beliefs and different domains (σ-algebras) on which they hold beliefs, to account for differences in awareness and conceptualisation. As is shown, group beliefs can incorporate all information spread across individuals without individuals having to communicate their information (which may be complex, hard-to-describe, or not describable in principle due to language restrictions); individuals should instead communicate their prior and posterior beliefs. The group beliefs derived here take a simple multiplicative form if people’s information is independent (and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily), which contrast with familiar linear or geometric opinion pooling and the (Pareto) requirement of respecting unanimous beliefs.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Additional Information:||© 2009 The authors|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Journal of Economic Literature Classification System:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General|
|Sets:||Research centres and groups > LSE Choice Group
Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Departments > Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Collections > Economists Online
|Identification Number:||vol. 5, no. 5|
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