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Translucency, assortation, and information pooling: how groups solve social dilemmas

Spiekermann, Kai (2007) Translucency, assortation, and information pooling: how groups solve social dilemmas. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 6 (3). pp. 285-306. ISSN 1470-594X

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Identification Number: 10.1177/1470594X07081300

Abstract

In one-shot public goods dilemmas, defection is the strictly dominant strategy. However, agents with cooperative strategies can do well if (1) agents are `translucent' (that is, if agents can fallibly recognize the strategy other agents play ex ante) and (2) an institutional structure allows `assortation' such that cooperative agents can increase the likelihood of playing with their own kind. The model developed in this article shows that even weak levels of translucency suffice if cooperators are able to pool their information to exclude defectors. Computer simulations confirm this claim. The results imply that conditional cooperation can be a successful strategy given translucency and `assortation', even if the game has a one-shot character. The article discusses implications for moral theory against the backdrop of `virtual self-regard' and the concept of moral integrity.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://ppe.sagepub.com/
Additional Information: © 2007 SAGE Publications Ltd
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Sets: Departments > Government
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2010 16:39
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2012 11:41
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/26737

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