Spiekermann, Kai 
ORCID: 0000-0003-4983-5589
(2007)
Translucency, assortation, and information pooling: how groups solve social dilemmas.
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 6 (3).
pp. 285-306.
ISSN 1470-594X
Abstract
In one-shot public goods dilemmas, defection is the strictly dominant strategy. However, agents with cooperative strategies can do well if (1) agents are `translucent' (that is, if agents can fallibly recognize the strategy other agents play ex ante) and (2) an institutional structure allows `assortation' such that cooperative agents can increase the likelihood of playing with their own kind. The model developed in this article shows that even weak levels of translucency suffice if cooperators are able to pool their information to exclude defectors. Computer simulations confirm this claim. The results imply that conditional cooperation can be a successful strategy given translucency and `assortation', even if the game has a one-shot character. The article discusses implications for moral theory against the backdrop of `virtual self-regard' and the concept of moral integrity.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://ppe.sagepub.com/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 SAGE Publications Ltd |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2010 16:39 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Sep 2024 04:39 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/26737 |
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