Gerges, Fawaz A. (2004) Sunni insurgency. The Baltimore sun (04 Apr 2004) Opinion Piece.Full text not available from this repository.
This official version does not consider the existence of an indigenous, Islamist-nationalist resistance within the Sunni Arab community that appears to be the driving force behind the insurgency. Establishing the extent of al-Qaida's involvement is important so long as it does not distort understanding of who are the real players in Iraq. By fixating on al-Qaida and the Islamic extremists, the Bush administration underestimates the fundamental role played by Iraqi Sunni Islamists and nationalists in the insurgency. The minority Sunni Arabs had a dominant position under Mr. [Saddam Hussein]. According to Mr. Jumeili, only 13 percent of the dead insurgents were motivated by nationalist sentiments and only 2 percent were die- hard Baathists; foreign Islamists represented 5 percent. Of those 8,500 insurgents imprisoned by U.S. troops, 70 percent are also indigenous Islamists. (When pressed, U.S. commanders conceded that only 150 - less than 2 percent - are foreigners.) There is clearly more to the insurgency than the official U.S. version, which reduces everything to al-Qaida and the Baathists. The indigenous Islamist-nationalist character of the insurgency tells us that U.S. troops will likely face a prolonged, costly war in Iraq unless the political conditions fueling the insurgency are addressed.
|Item Type:||Website (Opinion Piece)|
|Additional Information:||© 2004 The Baltimore Sun|
|Library of Congress subject classification:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BP Islam. Bahaism. Theosophy, etc
J Political Science > JQ Political institutions Asia
|Sets:||Departments > International Relations|
|Date Deposited:||08 Dec 2009 11:11|
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