Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Favoritism under social pressure

Garicano, Luis, Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio and Prendergast, Canice (2005) Favoritism under social pressure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87 (2). pp. 208-216. ISSN 0034-6535

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 10.1162/0034653053970267


This paper is concerned with the effect of nonmonetary incentives on behavior, in particular with the study of social pressure as a determinant of corruption. We offer empirical evidence that shows how professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We find that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind. They show no such bias for games that are not close. We further find that when the rewards for winning games increase, referees change their bias accordingly. Lastly, we identify that the mechanism through which bias operates is to satisfy the crowd, by documenting how the size and composition of the crowd affect referee favoritism.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2009 The MIT Press
Divisions: Management
Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2009 16:52
Last Modified: 21 Jul 2024 23:21

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item